Introduction
In this paper, I conjecture that an expanded theory of communication can be constructed and show what it would look like in outline. If the conjecture proves to be valid, then it makes possible a unification of the aspects of semantics, syntax, and phonology that occur in communication. The key idea is based on an analogy between semantics and syntax and semantics and phonology and builds on section 7.1.1 and section 7.6 of Parikh [11] . As such, the second third of the paper is somewhat speculative. In the last section, I discuss the assumption of cheap talk.
While the paper covers a fair bit of ground in a relatively short space, its main point is that it is possible to develop a framework for communication so that given a speech wave produced by a speaker of a natural language it enables the computation of the expressions in the sentence uttered as well as their optimal meaning and structure.
Semantics
One reason why the broadly Gricean [7] framework has seemed ineluctable to many is that it comes across as being the only way to combine language and context and thereby gives rise to the semantics/pragmatics distinction itself-it appears to provide the only possible synthesis of semantics (i.e. language) and pragmatics (i.e. context). In the mainstream pipeline view of meaning, semantics first yields an underspecified, contextfree, and conventional content which is subsequently filled in contextually by pragmatics.
In stark contrast, in equilibrium semantics the context of utterance drills down into the lowest levels of sentences, making even so-called literal content thoroughly situated. Each word of a sentence in an utterance is associated with the context u and with a corresponding game. Besides these lexical games, there are phrasal and sentential games, all of them together called locutionary games and the solutions they yield locutionary meanings. In addition, there are illocutionary games at lexical, phrasal, and sentential levels to enable access to illocutionary meanings. 1 Rather than a linear view with semantic meaning as primary and pragmatic meaning as secondary, the picture suggested by equilibrium semantics is one of mereological interdependence with context inextricably mixed in. Since context is not an afterthought here, there is no question of any sort of underspecification. Only individual words have conventional meanings and the rest is all mutually determined by situated language and choice in the full sense of the term.
The framework is best seen as a unification of semantics and pragmatics into a single domain and discipline. In this sense, while it draws upon some of Grice's ideas-after all, he was one of the first philosophers to explicitly consider context-it offers a genuine nonlinear and mathematically worked out alternative to the Gricean synthesis of semantics and pragmatics. Equilibrium semantics may be described compactly via its system of constraints SCIF. When speech is considered, a fifth set of phonological constraints P would have to be added. S contains some account of the syntax of the language being considered. Syntax interacts with and is influenced by meaning, that is, the other three constraints in SCIF, but I will take it as given. S plays a critical role in the derivation of content. C is a set of conventional constraints that maps every word into one or more properties or relations. I maps the properties and relations obtained from the conventional constraint into infons, relational tuples that represent meanings. Which objects they get mapped into is in part determined by S and in part by our informational space or ontology relative to a context or utterance situation u. Together, C and I determine the set of possible meanings of every uttered word. Finally, F is in some sense the main constraint, the one that embodies much of the framework of equilibrium semantics. Essentially, a system of situated games provides a model of the utterance situation u, so that together with the sentence and its phrase structure, we can infer its meaning.
The general idea of equilibrium in equilibrium semantics is that all four sets of constraints are in equilibriumwithin each constraint and across constraints, both in the context of the system of meaning and grammar and in the context of utterances.
To start with, I will assume that, given an utterance situation u, there is a homomorphic map C u : L → I such that C u (α) is the locutionary content of expression α in u. 2 The central problem of semantics is to give an account of this content map from first principles for each given utterance situation u.
I now show with an example the game-theoretic aspect of equilibrium semantics, that is, constraint F. Assume that Alan and Barbara, or A and B, are planning a night out. 3 In this situation u, A utters the sentence below:
Harvey is playing. (ϕ)
On the intended reading, A is noting that the movie Harvey (1950, directed by Henry Koster) is currently showing in some theater. On the other reading, it could be the banal observation that their infant son Harvey is amusing himself in the next room. All A and B share at this stage is that the first interpretation is the more likely one based on the fact that they are discussing what to do this evening. How does A convey the intended reading to B in this situation?
1 Locutionary meaning is the kind of meaning that comes directly from the words in the sentence uttered in some context. It is contrasted with illocutionary meaning, which is the kind of meaning that comes exclusively from the context of the utterance. For example, if a child gets a very minor cut and starts crying, its mother may say, "You are not going to die." By this, the mother means to convey to the child that he will not die from the cut. (This part of the example is from Recanati [16] .) Here, only the first part of the meaning-that he will not die-is locutionary as it comes directly from the words in the sentence uttered. The italicized part of the meaning-from the cut-is illocutionary as it comes exclusively from the context. Both meanings together make up the literal meaning of the utterance. However, this utterance has a further illocutionary meaning as well, which is not part of the literal meaning but belongs to what is called an implicature. This further meaning is that he should therefore stop crying because the cut is not serious.
2 I is the monoid of infons, that is, relational tuples that represent meanings. 3 In Parikh [11] , this context is described in more elaborate ways via both situations and background games.
The sentence ϕ can be expressed as ϕ 1 • ϕ 2 • ϕ 3 with each ϕ i being a word of the sentence and with • being a suitable operation of concatenation. I will assume the possible meanings of each word are given by C and I. 4 As there are three words in the sentence, there are three lexical games. Figure 1 shows the lexical game of partial information for ϕ 1 = Harvey where ϕ 1 and ϕ 1 are alternative unambiguous but costlier expressions A could have uttered (e.g. The film Harvey and The boy Harvey respectively). I will take σ 1 and σ 1 to be the two possible contents of ϕ 1 = Harvey, that is, either the film Harvey or the boy Harvey. Initial situations s 1 and s 1 contain the respective intentions of the speaker to convey either σ 1 or σ 1 ; they both also contain the utterance situation u which contains the fact that they are discussing their plans for the evening.
Lexical Games
The payoffs obey the following inequalities:
The prior probabilities ρ 1 and ρ 1 require more detailed explanation.
Let P (x) be the probability that A is conveying the infon x and let x i stand for the possible contents σ y i of ϕ i , where y stands for zero or more primes. That is, x 1 is either σ 1 or σ 1 , x 2 is just σ 2 , assuming just one possible meaning for ϕ 2 = is, and x 3 is either σ 3 or σ 3 , the two possible meanings of ϕ 3 = playing, showing in a theater and amusing himself.
Then the probability at an initial node for a lexical game is not just ρ i = P (σ i ) for example, 6 but it is really the conditional probability P (σ i | x −i , u), where x −i are the possible contents of words in ϕ other than those corresponding to x i . In plain English, this is read as the conditional probability that A is conveying the content σ i given that A is conveying the other possible contents x −i and given the utterance situation u. 4 See Chapters 3 and 4 in Parikh [11] for the full details. 5 These inequalities can be derived from more basic considerations of the costs and benefits of communication. I omit these details here. 6 or ρ i y = P (σ y i ) more generally
based on the different possible values of the conditioning variables. So, for this sentence, there are two possible values for ρ 1 . In general, of course,
which involves the same two cases P (σ 1 | σ 2 , σ 3 , u) and P (σ 1 | σ 2 , σ 3 , u). It may be, for example, that P (σ 1 | σ 2 , σ 3 , u) = 0.9. Then we must have P (σ 1 | σ 2 , σ 3 , u) = 1 − 0.9 = 0.1. Intuitively, the first probability is high because the content σ 1 which corresponds to the film Harvey is conditioned by σ 3 , which corresponds to the sense of playing involving showing in a theater. Similarly,
, where the first probability may be 0.2 and the second, therefore, 0.8.
Since there are two possible values for ρ 1 , the game g 1 involves a choice not just of utterance and interpretation but also of the initial (i.e. prior) probability.
It is easy to see that P (σ 1 | σ 2 , σ 3 , u) > P (σ 1 | σ 2 , σ 3 , u) because all the conditioning variables-u and σ 3 in particular-push in the same direction. The situation u supports their discussing their plans for the evening and, in attending to this, the probability on the left is pushed upwards. The infon σ 3 also pushes upwards because the interpretation of showing in a theater reinforces the interpretation of Harvey as the film (i.e. σ 1 ) rather than as the boy (i.e. σ 1 ). Since there is upwards pressure from all conditioning variables (σ 2 has no effect), we can say that
However, the situation is less straightforward with the other distribution. Is
Here, it is clear that u pushes upward on the former probability as before (i.e. the interpretation σ 1 of Harvey as the film is preferred), but now σ 3 (i.e. the meaning amusing oneself ) pushes in the opposite direction, favoring σ 1 (i.e. the interpretation of Harvey as the boy). Indeed, it is even arguable that this latter push outweighs the former since the combination of meanings σ 1 and σ 3 is somewhat incoherent. So we are forced to conclude that in fact
The agents therefore face a two-level optimization problem. At the first level, they either assume that ρ 1 > ρ 1 (i.e. they consider the first distribution above) and then solve the game to get the Pareto-Nash equilibrium 7 involving ϕ 1 and σ 1 (i.e. (ϕ 1 ϕ 1 , σ 1 )) or they assume the opposite values ρ 1 < ρ 1 (i.e. they consider the second distribution) and then solve the game to get the Pareto-Nash equilibrium involving ϕ 1 and σ 1 (i.e. (ϕ 1 ϕ 1 , σ 1 )). With fixed prior probabilities, both these equilibria are Nash equilibria. Now, because there are two different assumptions about the prior probabilities, that is, there are two different distributions from which one has to be selected, they are both Pareto-Nash equilibria as well, each corresponding to one of the distributions. This is reasonable since, in a sense, two different versions of g 1 are being considered by the agents, one involving ρ 1 > ρ 1 and the other involving ρ 1 < ρ 1 .
At the second level, they make a choice about which assumption or inequality is the right one, that is, they solve for the optimal probability distribution, either P (σ 1 | σ 2 , σ 3 , u) (and its complement) or P (σ 1 | σ 2 , σ 3 , u) (and its complement), or more crudely, they solve for whether ρ 1 is high or low (e.g. whether it is 0.9 or 0.2 in the numerical example above).
In general, at the level of g 1 alone, there is no way for the agents to solve the second level of this problem. Locally, both equilibria are acceptable because the underlying probability distributions satisfy different inequalities. The main point being made here is that a two-tier equilibrium problem is involved in solving g 1 , and an equilibrium involves not two but three things: the equilibrium utterance, the equilibrium interpretation, and the equilibrium probability distribution. The fact that the prior probability distribution is a choice variable itself is a new feature of games and gives rise to an extended notion of equilibrium that I call a global equilibrium.
Likewise, we get lexical games g 2 and g 3 for the other two words ϕ 2 and ϕ 3 . Their prior probabilities work similarly. For example,
. The circular and two-level nature of global equilibrium should now be clear: the choice of the optimal probability distribution in each game depends on which contents are optimal in the other two games as these condition the distributions, and the choice of the optimal content in each game depends on the optimal distribution in that game. I repeat that the possible contents of each word arise through constraints C and I. That is what enables us to build these games. The possible contents of phrases and sentences are not given directly but emerge only through the possible contents of words. Similar lexical games can be formed for each word in any utterance. For a general sentence ϕ = ϕ 1 • . . .
• ϕ n uttered in some utterance situation u, the corresponding lexical games are denoted by g(ϕ i , u) = g u (ϕ i ) = g i for i = 1 to n.
Phrasal and Sentential Games
Phrasal and sentential games are built from atomic lexical games by defining a product operation ⊗ on the space of games of partial information. That is, we generate the set of partial information games G by starting with the set of lexical games (with a fixed u) and multiplying them with one another. For the purposes of this paper, I take this game product as given-the details can be found in Parikh [11] . The phrasal game g 23 = g 2 ⊗ g 3 corresponds to the phrase ϕ 2 ϕ 3 and the sentential game g 123 = g 1 ⊗ g 23 corresponds to the whole sentence ϕ. I display part of the latter game visually in Figure 2 without comment for the reader's convenience. Its payoffs are omitted.
These two games also participate in the circular two-level global equilibrium along with the three lexical games. For example, the choice of optimal distribution in g 23 depends on the optimal value of x 1 , and the optimal value of x 1 depends on the optimal distribution in g 1 , which depends on the optimal values of x 2 and x 3 , which depend on the optimal distributions in g 2 and g 3 and g 23 ! Of the four prior probabilities in g 123 , one is ρ 123 = P (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 | u). Notice that now there is only one conditioning variable u for this probability as also for the other three. This means there is only one probability distribution because A and B are discussing their plans for the evening in u. It follows that ρ 123 is higher than the initial probabilities corresponding to other combinations of meanings (like σ 1 , σ 2 , and σ 3 ). That is, both A and B share the fact that the probability associated with A conveying that the film Harvey is showing in a theater is the highest; the probability associated with A conveying that their son is amusing himself is next in the ranking; and the other two probabilities are almost zero because they refer to more or less incoherent contents.
Since there is just one distribution and one corresponding ranking of probabilities, the second-tier equilibrium problem becomes trivial for g 123 . Its unique Pareto-Nash solution is that A utters ϕ 1 ϕ 2 ϕ 3 and B interprets it as σ 1 σ 2 σ 3 , exactly as we would expect intuitively or experimentally.
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Since the solutions to all the interdependent games must be simultaneously consistent, the sentential game solution σ 1 σ 2 σ 3 cascades down the parse tree to the phrasal and lexical games forcing the solution to g 1 to be ϕ 1 and σ 1 and the high probability for ρ 1 (i.e. ρ 1 = P (σ 1 | σ 2 , σ 3 , u)). The same pattern holds for g 3 and g 23 where the non-trivial two-tier problems get resolved in the same way by the requirement of global equilibrium.
Thus, the solutions to the family of games are obtained globally. g 123 was built up from g 1 and g 23 , and g 23 from g 2 and g 3 , and then the solution to g 123 enabled the solution to the atomic games. The key upshot of all the prior probabilities in various games being conditioned by the contents or solutions of other games is that the meanings of the words in an utterance are interdependent and influence each other. Each probability in a game affects the interpretation of the part of the utterance in that game. But each such probability is itself affected by the interpretations of other parts of the utterance. Thus, the interpretations of the parts of the utterance affect each other. Put differently, the solutions of the different games affect each other.
These probabilities can be more compactly expressed by writing This discussion shows how games of partial information can be set up to model the context of utterance u in order to derive the actual content of each word, phrase, and the entire sentence from the various possible contents as the solution to the relevant game.
Equilibrium Semantics and Locutionary Meaning
Equilibrium semantics consists essentially of the two homomorphic maps shown below:
These maps connect three monoids 9 and take us from words and phrases via their embedding situations and corresponding games to their locutionary contents. They map the parse trees of the sentence to corresponding "trees of games" and to trees of contents (or infons) as shown in Figure 3 .
10 That is, g u maps a word or expression into a corresponding game relative to the context of utterance u. These games are embedded in an isomorphic tree of games, that is, a tree with the same structure as the parse tree. And f u maps each game into its unique solution, which is its corresponding locutionary content.
The three isomorphic trees These three trees give us the full solution to the problem of deriving the locutionary meaning of ϕ from first principles. There are five nodes in each tree and there are correspondingly five expressions, five games, and five contents. The second tree is obtained from the first via g u and the third tree is obtained from the second via f u . Notice how the ideas of generativity and (global) equilibrium combine in these trees, especially in the latter two.
If we make explicit the dependence of the map g u (α i ) on the prior probabilities that come from u and other conditioning variables, we can write this as g u (α i , P i (x | u)). Here α i is any constituent of ϕ and i ranges from 1 to the number of nodes in the parse tree. This then allows us to write
, which is equal to x i in global equilibrium. So if we express this in vector notation by including all the i's, we get a compact and elegant vector fixed point equation:
This is the equation 12 we have to solve to compute the locutionary meaning of an utterance. It nicely captures the idea of global equilibrium, local at one level and global at the second. Thus, equilibrium semantics provides a new theory and framework for computing locutionary meaning from scratch. Equation 1 can also be expressed by the commutative diagram shown in Figure 4 .
I now point out a fundamental consequence: because the Pareto-Nash equilibrium involves a set of numerical or algebraic simultaneous linear equations and inequalities, what has been achieved is a transformation of words and phrases together with the ambient circumstances into a system of simultaneous linear equations and inequalities. Thus, to figure out the locutionary meaning of any utterance (in principle) all that is required is the solution of this system. We have metamorphosed words into numbers! The solution of this system is a double fixed point: the Nash equilibrium is itself a fixed point but because the probabilities in each game are interdependent, so are the games; thus the overall global solution to all the interdependent games in the tree of games simultaneously considered is a fixed point among fixed points, or a double fixed point.
Another somewhat startling consequence of this framework is that the hallowed Fregean principle of compositionality doesn't hold in general. The interdependence of the meanings of words and phrases arises from the interdependence of probabilities and the concomitant interdependence of the corresponding games. This means we no longer have the compositional principle that the meaning of a composite expression is a function of the meanings of its component parts given independently. This is because the meanings of the component parts in turn depend on the meanings of the other parts and the whole. In our simple example "Harvey is playing," we may write:
and more generally, we may write:
where h, h , h are suitable functions derived from Equation 1. Of course, the noun phrase N P and verb phrase V P can be further broken down into their constituents in these equations. It is the presence of the second and third equations in each set above that disqualifies the Fregean principle since it requires the meanings of the component parts to be determined independently and directly. Another interesting way to put this is to say that the equations combine Fregean compositionality with Frege's context principle, two ideas that are generally taken to be at odds with each other.
Only in the special case where there are no lexical ambiguities will Fregean compositionality work. In general, we will have to resort to the double fixed point computation to determine the meanings of composite expressions. Thus, the principle of compositionality has to be replaced by the more general fixed point principle. The latter reduces to the former when no lexical ambiguities are present.
I now state a result involving the universality of games of partial information.
Theorem 1 Given a homomorphic interpretation function C u : L → I and given the game function g u :
This result involving the universality of g u and therefore of games of partial information-which is not difficult to prove-has the following fundamental consequence: if there is any other theory that succeeds in providing an account of the locutionary interpretation function C u , the theorem says that it has to be equivalent to the map f u • g u . Thus, games of partial information are essential to interpretation or are "universal." The result also tells us that Equation 1 always has a unique solution. 
2.
A utters ϕ in u.
B (explicitly or implicitly) intends to interpret ϕ in u.
4. B interprets ϕ in u. (4) are common knowledge between A and B in u.
(2) and
6. f u [g u (ϕ)] = (σ, π).
(6) is common knowledge between A and B in u.
The reason why the intention in #1 above is either explicit or implicit is that not all of the content needs to be explicitly intended. I remind readers that this is the problem Grice [7] and many others after him attempted to solve over a period of forty years. 15 The above is my solution to it. Part of the significance of this reduction of the semantic to the psychological lies in the role it plays in giving a naturalistic solution to the problem of intentionality, the problem of linguistic and mental representation.
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I should perhaps mention that I cannot deal with illocutionary meaning, which includes implicature, in this paper, but suffice it to say that the treatment is similar even though there are additional complexities to consider. 17 It was for this reason that I said at the outset that the framework of equilibrium semantics is 13 Note that when an utterance is intended to have two or more meanings-as with a pun-the solution fu will be a mixed strategy involving multiple meanings, each with some probability.
14 "Convey" merely signifies a transfer of information (or misinformation), as from one computer disk to another. We could replace "convey" with "bring about a transfer of." Here, π is the probability with which σ is communicated. That is, the equilibrium of the game of partial information may involve a mixed strategy. 15 Grice actually tried to give a definition of "non-natural meaning," which in my scheme is closely related to the definition of communication given above and can be found in Parikh [10, 11] . 16 See Stalnaker [18] , for example. 17 See chapter 4 of Parikh [11] .
best seen as a unification of semantics and pragmatics into a single domain and discipline.
Syntax
Syntax has so far played an external role in my description of equilibrium semantics. It has influenced the shape of the trees on which the maps g u and f u act. 18 This itself raises a question: what should be done in cases of structural ambiguity when more than one parse is available? A straightforward but uncreative response is to say that all possible parses should be generated and the one that provides the best payoff in the relevant games should be chosen. This choice can also be formulated as a game but it is both theoretically and practically unappealing. Practically, most sentences will have multiple parses and we don't seem to first generate and then discard most of them when we interpret utterances. That would be too costly. What is required is that the semantic constraints act on the internal processes of parse generation and include them in the equilibrium process. This would enable the idea of equilibrium to apply to both semantic and syntactic constraints and make the framework theoretically more attractive as well.
Here is my first conjecture. Just as the maps g u and f u are homomorphisms and therefore enable alternative routes in principle to computing meaning, either via the left or middle or right sides of the equation
, likewise, there ought to be similar homomorphic maps that take one inside the parse generation process that suggest alternative routes to incorporating this process both internally and externally. And just as the maps g u and f u result in Equation 1, so these hypothetical syntax-related homomorphisms might be incorporable into this equation as well. If this were possible, then the problem of generating all possible parses may be averted. For such a plan to be carried out, it would be necessary to figure out a way to introduce the notion of value or payoffs and probabilities for syntactic elements as well. That is, here generativity and equilibrium might become even more closely entwined than has been shown so far and the rule-governed proof-theoretic processes of syntax may be partly replaceable with model-theoretic processes of game-theoretic optimization and equilibrium instead. That is, there could be a trade-off between the complexity of a system of competence and the complexity of a system of performance.
The natural way in which such a game-theoretic or equilibrium syntax may be realized is as follows: just as we had games of partial information g u that involved a choice of utterance by the speaker and a choice of meaning by the addressee in semantics, so there would be similar games that involved a choice of utterance by the speaker and a choice of syntactic category and parse tree by the addressee. And there would again be lexical, phrasal, and sentential games here as well. Moreover, these syntactic games would interact and influence one another exactly as do the semantic games. Finally, the double fixed point solution to these interdependent games would yield the optimal parse tree rather than the optimal meaning. In other words, we could conjecture that the form of the solution to the optimal parse is exactly as before:
where C u stands for the syntactic category function providing full fine-grained syntactic information, y stands for the detailed category and parse of the phrase α, f u and g u are the analogous maps for syntax, and the rest of the symbols are the same as before.
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Of course, this much merely asserts an obvious Fregean parallelism between semantics and syntax; what is missing is the interactions between syntactic and semantic elements at and across every level of the possible parse trees in a larger, truly global equilibrium. In the structurally ambiguous sentence:
18 It also plays a role in determining the possible meanings of words. See Parikh [11] . 19 The alternative sentences uttered in g u would specify the relevant grammatical category explicitly.
Harvey saw her duck.
the lexical item duck can be either a verb or a noun; the optimal choice of syntactic category depends on the meaning of duck and vice versa. Not only this, each syntactic category (and parse tree) depends on each semantic meaning and vice versa in a completely circular and co-determining way. That is, the meaning of duck depends on the category of duck and the meanings and categories of all the other words, phrases, and entire sentence; likewise, the category of duck depends on the meaning of duck and the meanings and categories of all the other words, phrases, and the entire sentence.
The syntactic lexical game for the category of duck
In the syntactic lexical game in Figure 5 , it is the category of duck, verb V or noun N , as well as the corresponding parse tree (not explicitly shown in the figure), that is being communicated and that the addressee has to figure out. And, as in the other semantic lexical games, the initial probabilities here are also strategic variables and are conditioned by all the other categories of the expressions in µ and all the meanings of the expressions in µ. Phrasal and sentential syntactic games are handled similarly.
The entire set of interdependent semantic and syntactic games for an utterance leads to a grander fixed point equation with the same form as before:
except that now C doubles for both the parse and the meaning function 20 and x can be the equilibrium parse or meaning. The conditioned and conditioning variables in the vector P (x | u) = (P i (x | u)) = (P i (x i | x −i , u)) would now be not just the meanings of the other items but also their parses. That is, g u and g u are interdependent in Equation 3 whereas they are obviously not in Equations 1 and 2 where they occur separately. This then is the fundamental equation that has to be solved when agents communicate. It represents a further generalization of Frege's principle of semantic compositionality involving the parallelism between syntax and semantics to what I will call the generalized fixed point principle that captures their mutual determination as well. Semantics not only mirrors syntax, as Frege suggested, the two interact and reciprocally determine each other's optimal selection as well.
Perhaps for the first time, therefore, communication and the flow of information appear not only as the communication and flow of optimal meanings but also as the communication and flow of optimal grammatical parses. When a speaker utters a sentence like µ, he expects the addressee to figure out both its syntax and its semantics in a mutually determining way. The key insight of this view is to see syntax game-theoretically 20 Likewise, gu doubles for gu and g u and fu doubles for fu and f u .
with the speaker uttering words, phrases, and sentences and the addressee figuring out both their grammar and their meaning simultaneously.
A deeper way of stating this game-theoretic and equilibrium-based insight is that the content of an utterance is not just its meaning but also its syntax. Words when uttered not only have meanings but also have structure. Language is about the world, but it is also about grammar, and both types of content are required to mutually determine each other. The homomorphic maps g u and f u and g u and f u provide a compact way of expressing how to get from an utterance to its equilibrium content in this generalized sense. This way of looking at syntax makes it completely analogous to semantics at an abstract level. Just as semantics is a map from language to world, so syntax is a map from language to structure. These two maps interact to provide the equilibrium content of all utterances. Just as meaning is situated, so is grammar. Both concern the flow of information from speaker to addressee and are fully interdependent and circular: neither is prior to the other. The linear pipeline view involving syntax, semantics, and then pragmatics is now fully transcended.
The intricate connection between generativity and equilibrium can also now be seen more transparently. The rules of a grammar may generate various syntactic structures but the cutting power derived from equilibrium may also reduce the number of rules required as certain possibilities may get eliminated simply in virtue of their being suboptimal. This is the trade-off between competence and performance mentioned earlier.
The universality result can also be extended to include both syntax and semantics, and games of partial information are universal with respect to both syntax and semantics. To spell out its essential meaning with respect to syntax, if a method is found to map any utterance to its optimal parse tree, 21 then it will be equivalent to the alternative route via a game-theoretic or equilibrium syntax. We can put the diagrams for the two results together as shown in the composite commutative diagram in Figure 6 .
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2.
3. (2) is common knowledge between A and B in u.
4. B interprets ϕ (syntactically) in u.
The only substantive difference between Definition 1 and Definition 2 is that the explicit or implicit intentions in the former have been dropped in the latter. This is reasonable since the communication of grammatical structure is not something either speaker or addressee is generally aware of. Otherwise, the form of syntactic communication is identical to the form of semantic communication-both involve the same kinds of strategic inferences.
Phonology
Now that we have seen the analogy between semantics and syntax, it should be easy to bring phonology into the fold. However, there is an inverse process that occurs in phonology: we do not start with words and produce the counterpart of meanings or structure; we start with sound patterns and produce words. If we are to suggest a triangular compositional fixed point principle with semantics, syntax, and phonology, then certain small changes need to be made in how semantics and syntax have so far been pictured.
Essentially, what an addressee is given in an utterance situation is not words but what may simply be called perception sequences or even just perceptions. These will typically be sound waves reaching the ears of the addressee if speech is being considered, but they could also be visual patterns reaching the eyes of the addressee if text is being read. In either case, the speech or text need to be recognized. It is the first of these that concerns me here although my remarks could, I suppose, be carried over to text.
The particular difficulty we face with sounds is that that the input stream is continuous over the whole sentence rather than discrete. So there are no immediately available units of sound waves that can be mapped into words. The units themselves have to be produced by the interpretation process. In order to make this problem more tractable, I will break it into two parts.
I will start by assuming that the appropriate units of sound that correspond to words and phrases are in fact available at the outset. Collect these together in the monoid (W, •) where W is the set of sound waves w i that correspond to expressions α i and • is an associative operation of concatenation. Then, we first need to replace (L, •) by (W, •) in Figure 6 so that the maps in that diagram start from the perceived sound waves rather than from expressions. But we also need a third triangle that produces expressions from the waves. It is difficult to draw all three triangles in a single diagram so I present them in two separate pictures Figure 7 and Figure 8 that are meant to be viewed as connected together in one large diagram. 
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Figure 8: The semantic and syntactic triangles:
The same basic equation as before holds but with a more general interpretation.
except that now C triples for all three types of generalized content: expressions, their structure, and their meaning. The conditioned and conditioning variables in the vector
would now not be just meanings and parse trees but also expressions. Notice that the expression α has been replaced by the wave sequence w. This then is the even more basic equation that has to be solved when agents communicate. It represents yet a further generalization of Frege's principle of semantic compositionality involving the parallelism between syntax and semantics to what I will continue to call the generalized fixed point principle that captures the mutual determination of meaning, structure, and language given an input of sound waves. Semantics, syntax, and phonology mutually determine one another's optimal selection. We could even give a definition for the communication of phonological content.
Definition 3 A communicates the expression (α, π) to B by producing w in u if and only if 1. A (explicitly or implicitly) intends to convey (α, π) to B in u.
2.
A produces w in u.
B (explicitly or implicitly) intends to interpret w in u.
4. B interprets w in u. (4) are common knowledge between A and B in u.
(2) and
6. f u [g u (w)] = (α, π).
(6) is common knowledge between A and B in u.
To get a complete definition of communication, it would be necessary to replace ϕ by w in the first two definitions and then to combine all the three definitions by ensuring that the conditioning variables x −i in the initial probabilities in the three functions g u , g u , and g u reflect the interdependencies of semantic, syntactic, and phonological contents. For later reference, I call this Definition 0.
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22 While this definition applies only to speech, it can be readily generalized to text and to non-linguistic utterances.
As I mentioned above, I was splitting the phonological problem into two parts, first assuming that the relevant wave units were given, and only then considering how these units might themselves emerge from a continuous speech wave corresponding to an entire sentence.
To tackle the first problem now, all we need to do is to reconsider the set W of waves as the source of alternative unit waves and corresponding word sequences or sentences. Then, given a continuous speech wave for an entire sentence, the addressee would face the problem of disambiguating not just the lexical interpretations of pre-given waves, but also implicitly choosing the relevant optimal units themselves from alternative wave sequences. Solving the interdependent games that result would give one both the optimal wave sequences and their optimal interpretations simultaneously. In principle, this should not be difficult to do but this is not the place to work out a detailed example though I should mention that the games of partial information may become a little more complex. The final consequence would simply be an even more general equation with the same form.
The w ∈ W in Equation 5 now refers only to the composite and continuous wave that is perceived in an utterance; otherwise, this equation is the same as Equation 4 above.
Needless to say, this view taken as a whole is speculative at best, but because it is based on rich analogies, it is, at least in my opinion, an extremely attractive picture. Integrating all three domains would, of course, have to be worked out in detail. If interpretation in real time were involved, Equation 5 would have to be modified slightly. But if this intuition turns out to bear fruit, there would be not only an equilibrium semantics and not only an equilibrium syntax but also an equilibrium phonology and, indeed, a true equilibrium linguistics tying all the major parts of language into a single unified account, into a genuine science of language.
Grammar and Metaphysics
Just as we have to choose one way of breaking up a continuous speech wave for an entire sentence from multiple alternatives drawn from W, we can think of the choice of optimal parse tree as being considered not just across the parse trees made available by a single pre-given grammar, but across parse trees coming from different and competing grammars for the same language. Of course, the analogy between choosing an optimal disaggregated sound sequence from a continuous speech wave and choosing an optimal grammar from a set of possible grammars is partial: while the continuous speech wave that has to be broken down into alternative discrete wave sequences extends over just the one utterance, the choice of optimal parse trees has to work for not just a single utterance but across all possible utterances as each grammar is the grammar of the whole language. If this consistency condition across utterances could be formulated, something I believe it is possible to do, then there would be a way of solving not just for the content communicated in a single utterance but also for the optimal grammar for the language. In theory at least, one could take a speech or text corpus of documents and apply such a consistency condition across all the sentences in the corpus together with the double fixed point computation for the content of each utterance. In other words, the decision problem for the optimal grammar for a corpus could be solved.
In the same way, the ontology from which the possible meanings of utterances were drawn was taken as given. However, it is agents of different kinds that individuate the entities in the ontology. That is, there is an interaction between agents and the world that produces the world of entities as we know it via a process of simultaneous co-determination. Quine [12, 13, 14] has argued convincingly that ontologies may not be unique even for the same species. Extending the analogy between phonology and grammar to metaphysics, it may be possible to say that it is not necessary to accept Quine's conclusions about radical indeterminacy in communication. Again, the jointly optimal processes of equilibration across all utterances would eliminate all the suboptimal ontologies and thereby make available a unique shared ontology for the species. It would then not just be the parts of symbol systems that interact with one another to be about pre-existing semantic values. Instead, all the parts (e.g. "gavagai," to use Quine's example, or the sound pattern for "gavagai") and all the possible semantic values (e.g. rabbits and undetached rabbit parts and rabbit stages) would interact to result in one grand and evolving metaphysical equilibrium that is responsible for meaning and structure and language on one side and the world as we know it on the other.
If all these plausible analogies can be given any flesh, it would become possible to extend equilibrium linguistics, which includes semantics, syntax, and phonology, to an equilibrium grammar and an equilibrium metaphysics as well. There would then be a fully worked out theory of what might be called radical communication.
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Strategic Inference
The concept of strategic inference was first introduced in Parikh [9] . It was used to describe the processes involved in communication that enable an addressee to infer the full meaning of an utterance. It primarily includes its strategic aspects requiring each agent to take account of the other agent's possible actions, which in turn involve the various probabilistic inferences that are necessary to take account of the interactions between and among the partial meanings (and parse trees and linguistic expressions) of an utterance.
Remember that the interactions among the various conditional probabilities P (x i | x −i , u) which result in the inferential pushes and pulls on the various partial contents are in fact pushes and pulls among the speaker A conveying these contents rather than direct interactions among abstract contents. That presence of the speaker's possible actions-conveying this or that meaning, parse tree, or word-and corresponding interpretive actions by the addressee is what makes all the component inferences strategic and the overall inference also strategic, resulting in a global equilibrium involving choices of initial probabilities, utterances, and interpretations. As should now be clear, it is this very different conception of a situated inference that is required to give an account of inference for a situated language like English. The presence of indeterminacy, something I have not considered here but do consider in Parikh [11] , makes this probabilistic reasoning even more ineluctable.
Such an account will naturally look quite different from the conventional model-theoretic account of inference where there are two parallel sides, one carried out syntactically with sentences and the other carried out semantically with their contents, resulting in the twin concepts of soundness and completeness. In general, the syntactic shape of a sentence no longer suffices to tell us what inferences and inference rules are acceptable, since the utterance situation u that accompanies it plays a crucial part in the inference, and u is a part of the world and not a part of language. Indeed, without u there is no utterance and without an utterance there is no content.
At this stage, it is not clear what an appropriate theory of inference based on equilibrium semantics would look like. Presumably, it would have to be embedded in a wider theory of situated inference. I suspect that altogether different types of mathematics may be involved in such a theory, possibly drawing upon optimization theory conceived as encompassing the narrower field of game theory. That is, an inference in the traditional sense would have to be recast as an optimization problem of some sort, probably involving a theory of global equilibrium. It is known that the inferences of ordinary propositional logic can be so 23 I have not mentioned one aspect of radical communication in this paper, something about which Davidson [3] says the following:
But such theories fail to reach the evidence, for it seems clear that the semantic features of words cannot be explained directly on the basis of non-linguistic phenomena. The reason is simple. The phenomena to which we must turn are the extra-linguistic interests and activities that language serves, and these are served by words only in so far as the words are incorporated in (or on occasion happen to be) sentences. But then there is no chance of giving a foundational account of words before giving one of sentences.
It is clear that in section 2 I assumed that the range of possible (referential) meanings of words was given. Davidson is quite right in his observation though I cannot deal with it in this short paper. However, I sketch a solution to this problem in section 7.1.2 of Parikh [11] .
recast, so there is some warrant to hope that a general theory of situated inference based on the ideas of optimization and equilibrium could be created.
For the present, I remark that there is a notion of form in a strategic inference just as there is with an ordinary inference rule like modus ponens. It is possible to abstract from the particular sentences involved and look at modus ponens formally: one can say "from α and α → β, infer β" without specifying what particular sentences α and β stand for. Likewise, it should be obvious that all games of partial information have the same overall form independent of the particular locutions and contents being considered. Prima facie, it ought to be possible to say: "from a game of partial information involving primary unit w and primary content c, infer c," where c can be either a meaning or a parse tree or a word. However, a single game of partial information cannot be solved in isolation from the other games that arise across the entire utterance and so the notion of form turns out to be a little more complex.
In any case, the initial feeling of puzzlement that may have been experienced at the repetition of the "same" games in this paper and, indeed, in earlier publications of mine should now disappear. Just as we are not puzzled when someone points out that the forms of inferences involved in "from smoke, and smoke implies fire, infer fire" and in "from black clouds, and black clouds imply rain, infer rain" are the same even though their contents are dramatically different, so we should not be puzzled that all the games of partial information represent roughly the same form of strategic inference even though the particular perceptions and contents they embody are radically different. Indeed, if we are willing to grant that communication is almost as basic a human activity as thinking, then perhaps it is arguable that strategic inference is almost as basic a type of inference as modus ponens.
Games of Partial Information and Signaling Games
There is now a sizable literature in economics on so-called cheap talk games where linguistic utterances do not affect payoffs directly but can affect outcomes in certain circumstances. 24 In the games of partial information I have presented, utterances have both costs and benefits and so do affect payoffs directly. I make a few observations here about this contrast.
In order to avoid having to say "literal meaning and implicature" repeatedly, I refer to this level of meaning as basic meaning and the communication of basic meaning as basic communication.
Understanding Basic Communication
As we have just seen, what a speaker produces is a speech wave or marks on paper. This is completely opaque 25 and needs to be understood before any action can be taken. At this level, therefore, a speaker and addressee will generally want to cooperate. That is, they will share an interest in making basic meanings public between them. Even though their larger interests may be opposed, 26 their more basic communicative interests are not generally opposed. Not only do the interlocutors have to extract the words uttered but also their structure and basic meaning before any further strategizing can occur. However, these foundational interests can sometimes be at odds as evinced in Ionesco's absurdist play The Chairs though even there it is possible to claim that there are reasonably shared interests in conveying basic meanings. As a result, it seems correct to say that games involving the understanding of basic communication typically lead to coordinative payoffs rather than to payoffs representing mixed motives or outright conflict.
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24 See, primarily, Crawford and Sobel [2] , Farrell [4] , Rabin [15] , Farrell [5] , Farrell and Rabin [6] , and Stalnaker [19] , and the references therein. 25 The way I am using this word has nothing to do with the problem of opaque linguistic contexts. 26 See Kartik [8] who looks at the costs of lying.
27 By "coordinative" all I mean is that they satisfy inequalities of the type displayed in section 2 of this paper. Incidentally, this is also essentially Grice's insight as expressed in his Cooperative Principle except that he considers the speaker and addressee A key assumption in many cheap talk games, introduced by Farrell [5] , is the pre-existence of a "rich, common language" for communication. As Farrell and Rabin [6] say, this includes "all reasonably short utterances in English, for a start." While this assumption is always stated in terms of the availability of sentences of the language, what it actually assumes is the availability of literal meanings. Indeed, what is implicitly assumed is that all basic meanings including implicatures are also immediately given. The reason for this is that when a meaning is basic and coordinative, an agent might as well communicate it locutionarily because talk is cheap. Why bother to say one thing and mean another when you can costlessly say exactly what you want to imply? It appears that the only way to bring about divergences between saying and meaning in cheap talk games is by imposing artificial constraints on what can be said.
Is it possible to use cheap talk games to derive basic meanings? When we restrict payoffs to being largely coordinative, cheap talk games considered formally do not have the finer grain to discriminate between alternative basic meanings; they have to be taken as externally given. The only way to bring in the finer grain is to do away with the assumption of cheap talk and bring in costly but beneficial utterances as I have done in games of partial information. This also makes intuitive sense because while it does not seem to cost much to utter many ordinary sentences in absolute terms, speakers and addressees need to weigh the relative costs of different utterances. Not only this, the absolute benefits of even single utterances can sometimes be large not to mention again the relative benefits of different utterances. Thus, it appears that games of partial information rather than cheap talk games offer the right framework to study the understanding of basic communication.
Generating Basic Communication
Beyond the level of understanding, the assumption of cheap talk has also overlooked the rhetorical fact that giving a reason or an argument for a belief that a speaker is conveying can often make an utterance more credible. As the example in footnote 1 shows, the mother chooses to tell her child that he is not going to die rather than simply to stop crying. This gives the child a reason-that the cut is not serious-why he should not cry. In this situation, having such a reason is more satisfying to the child than simply being given a command to stop crying. So utterances can affect payoffs directly via the benefits they confer upon both the speaker and the addressee.
Notice that the costs of communicating this way by saying "You are not going to die" rather than "Stop crying" have also gone up both because the sentence is slightly longer and syntactically more complex and because its full basic meaning is also more complex. Because this full basic meaning is not transparently available, it has to be inferred and so the total cost of one utterance can be significantly higher than the total cost of another like "Stop crying."
Indeed, we can model the interaction between the mother and child as follows. Assume there are two situations (or types if you prefer) s and s where the mother will not fuss and will fuss over the child respectively. These possibilities are equally likely and ρ = ρ = 0.5. She considers two alternative ways to convey this to her child, either via the sentence α = "You are not going to die" or α = "Stop crying." The child can respond with either of two actions, a = 'stop crying' or a = 'continue crying.' Figure 9 shows a traditional signaling game with costly and beneficial signals rather than cheap talk. I urge the reader to work out the logic of the payoffs keeping in mind the additional costs and benefits of the more complex utterance and its full basic meaning as well as the benefits to the mother and child of different scenarios unfolding.
28 I am not interested in analyzing this game in detail so I just point out that one separating equilibrium is where the mother who is not going to fuss utters α and the mother who is cooperating in interpreting the words of an utterance whereas I am extending this coordination to include the prior starting point of interpreting the sound waves themselves.
28 I would like to thank Navin Kartik for pointing out to me that the mother incurs the cost of inferring the full basic meaning of both utterances no matter what she chooses to utter; this implies that for her the cost of inference is not a differentiator between the two utterances, only the length of the sentences (or their production cost) is. So far, the literature both in economics and philosophy has always assumed that either talk has to be cheap and only signals like education are costly or that talk has to be costly but coordinative. This mixed motive payoff-impacting language game arises because the mother wants her utterance to be credible and persuasive, and so chooses to convey a more complex content via a slightly longer sentence.
To put this insight in more general terms, the reason why different benefits result from different utterances is that our linguistic interactions involve a wide range of strategies that might all be collected under the single term rhetorical. The way something is conveyed often matters as much as what is conveyed. This remark takes Austin's [1] observation that we do things with words and embeds it in situations of interactive choice where one way of doing things with words can be better than another.
There are two general reasons for the emergence of costly linguistic signals. One is that sentences are costly to produce and the other is that sentences are opaque rather than transparent. Despite the mother and child having partly conflicting motives overall, they both want to cooperate in understanding their basic meanings. This ineluctably leads both mother and child to play a separate set of coordinative games of partial information. In those games, if α has been uttered, the child does not stop to ponder whether the mother could also have uttered α ; the only concern there is with what has already been uttered (i.e. "You are not going to die") and with how the content of that ambiguous sentence (as given in footnote 1) might have been conveyed in less ambiguous ways. Once the mother and child solve the partial information games for each sentence α and α apart from each other and apart from the originating signaling game, they use the inferred contents of these utterances to make their choices in the signaling game. It is the cost of this uttering and inferring, that is, the cost of playing the partial information games that makes talk costly.
Taking a closer look at the game above, the child seldom stops to play both sets of partial information games, but just hears the equilibrium utterance of α, infers its full basic meaning τ from the resulting partial information game, imagines the other possible content τ the mother might have conveyed rather than its sentential realization α , and plays the related content game in Figure 10 .
That is, the child responds to alternative contents and not to alternative signals though what he perceives is the signal α whose basic meaning τ he has to infer in order to generate the content game which he takes to be common knowledge between him and his mother. So he does not ever play either the signaling game or the partial information game for α , the other sentence. On the other hand, the mother needs to play the signaling game and both partial information games in general because she needs to consider the costs and benefits of both α and τ as against α and τ . In other words, speakers typically play signaling games and addressees typically play isomorphic content games. This is a delicate difference but one that is crucial because of what I have called the opacity of linguistic signals: they are just sound waves or marks on paper. If their meanings were transparently conveyed, there would be no need to differentiate between the two types of games.
The opacity of linguistic signals is a consequence of the nature of linguistic representation especially in the case of a natural language like English. As I have shown here and elsewhere, natural languages are characterized by extreme ambiguities and rely on contexts to convey their contents. In a word, natural languages are situated unlike formal languages. This situatedness creates great efficiencies in what we need to utter to convey a meaning but it extracts a price in the processing required to recover it. In the case of fully formal languages, there is a one-to-one mapping between formulas and their contents and, while there is some cost involved in going from one to the other, it is not as great as that for situated languages. There is thus a trade-off: if we use formal languages to communicate, our sentences would be very long and costly but the processing per symbol relatively cheap whereas if use situated languages, our sentences can be relatively short and cheap but the processing is costly. Indeed, as Wittgenstein said in his Notebooks: "A proposition like 'this chair is brown' seems to say something enormously complicated, for if we wanted to express this proposition in such a way that nobody could raise objections to it on grounds of ambiguity, it would have to be infinitely long." This also ought to make clear that, overall, situated languages are far more efficient but far more indeterminate than formal languages.
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Thus, communication can affect payoffs directly and not just mediately via the addressee's choice of action. This is especially so when the overall motives are mixed or conflictual. The interlocutors' costs of communication arise both from producing and receiving multiple or relatively longer and more complex sentences and from inferring their more complex contents. The corresponding benefits of communication also arise from these sentences and their contents. 30 Even in Spence's [17] paradigmatic job market signaling situation, it is abundantly clear that for most jobs employers will want to interview prospective employees and will even spend considerable sums to organize the interviews.
To sum up, it could be argued that games involving linguistic communication have a three-level structure. The first or top level is that of a content game that I will call a communication game as this is the level where alternative contents are considered for communication. The equilibrium content is influenced by the possible actions of the addressee.
This top level gives rise to two further levels. The first is a set of what might be called generation games after 29 If there is a very long formal sentence, both the production and processing costs rise even though per symbol the processing cost is less for a formal language.
30 The benefits we derive from sentences as opposed to contents are most noticeable when we read fine prose or poetry.
the problem of natural language generation in linguistics. This is the level at which the equilibrium content from the communication game is converted into possible sentences the speaker could utter in a given context to realize it. I have not described generation games in this paper. The solution to the set of generation games is then uttered by the speaker and perceived by the addressee. It is the equilibrium utterance corresponding to the equilibrium content from the communication game.
Last is the set of partial information games that I will jointly call games of understanding after the problem of natural language understanding in linguistics. This is the level at which the sentence uttered by the speaker is converted by the addressee into its basic content (i.e. literal plus implied meaning). Generation games and games of understanding are roughly inverses of each other. Once the addressee has inferred the basic content, she goes back to the communication game and chooses her equilibrium action and the circle is complete.
A communication game and its corresponding generation games and games of understanding-that is, the whole three-tier structure-may be called a language game. Importantly, no component of language games involves cheap talk: in all, utterances have direct costs and benefits.
Higher-Order Meanings
So far, I have dealt with the basic meanings of the communication in Figures 9 and 10 . Are there any non-basic meanings that supervene on these?
Notice that by playing the generation game, the mother has also conveyed to the child whether she will fuss or not fuss. As I had assumed that ρ = ρ = 0.5, there is an even chance that she will be of either type. If she is not going to fuss, the separating equilibrium will lead her to say "You are not going to die," the child will play the relevant games of understanding, and stop crying. If she is going to fuss, the same equilibrium will lead her to say "Stop crying," the child will play a different set of games of understanding, and continue crying. What the mother will therefore also implicitly have conveyed is either that she will not fuss or that she will fuss. What should we make of either meaning?
Let us consider the meaning that she will not fuss as it is the utterance leading to this meaning that we have examined. It is arguable that, given the situation they are in, this meaning comes from the literal meaning that the child is not going to die from the cut and from the implicature that he should therefore stop crying because the cut is not serious. In other words, it could be called a second-order meaning. It turns out to have the properties of implicature Grice [7] and others identified: calculability, defeasibility, nondetachability, indeterminacy, and reinforceability. But it is not an implicature because it fails to satisfy Definition 1: it does not emerge from a game of understanding but from a generation game and so it is not part of what is communicated. It could be argued that the definition should be broadened to include such games but I do not pursue this possibility here. Perhaps one could say that basic meanings are more directly linked to language even though they are highly contextual whereas non-basic second-order meanings are purely situational.
This way of characterizing it raises some interesting questions. Consider what happens when someone truthfully says he is tall but wants to convey that he is in fact taller than he really is by exploiting the vagueness of "tall." If the adjective covers an interval of heights from 5 8 to 6 2 in the relevant context, then the addressee, who cannot see him and who is aware of this inflationary desire, tries to compensate for the slight exaggeration and infers he is 5 10 . This makes their motives mixed.
Literally, he has conveyed that he is of greater than average height. "Tall" is ambiguous between this literal meaning and "unlikely" as in a "tall tale" and it is this former content that is determined by the relevant game of understanding. From this, she infers as an implicature that his height is roughly in the interval [5 8 , 6 2 ] . And, finally, she picks 5 10 as a second-order meaning. The first two basic meanings are inferred contextually via coordinative payoffs; only the last higher-order one is obtained via mixed motives.
This would seem to lend some weight to the view that literal meanings and implicatures generally involve coordination. That is, Grice's Cooperative Principle appears to be largely correct. Strawson's [20] remark that the cooperative assumption is "a precondition of the possibility of the social institution of language" also reinforces this belief. However, should examples of mixed motive communication at the level of basic meaning appear, they are easy to accommodate formally in games of understanding by simply allowing payoffs representing mixed motives. The two-level language game I have described would remain because the alternative sentences considered in the generation game are in general different from the alternative sentences considered in the corresponding games of understanding. In the mother and child signaling game, the alternative sentences are "You are not going to die" and "Stop crying" whereas in the games of partial information corresponding to the first of these sentences the choices would be between "You are not going to die" where "die" is ambiguous 31 and something like "You are not going to pass away" which is less ambiguous but more costly.
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Second, can there be third-order and even higher-order meanings? I quote from section 7.9 of Parikh [10] :
In principle, there is nothing to stop us from considering higher-order implicatures. These would arise when a first-order implicature gives rise to a second-order implicature, the second-order implicature to a third-order implicature, and so on. Such higher-order implicatures are more difficult to derive and so are not commonly found in ordinary conversation. They require more explicit calculation and so are more often found in literary texts like novels and poems, where part of the point is not to state things too explicitly, but to leave them to the imagination of the reader ("show, don't tell"). This leaves room for creative readings and misreadings and enriches the text. A reader has to work harder to derive higher-order implicatures, and common knowledge at this relatively rarefied level becomes increasingly more tenuous. As a result, the reader has to bring in his own private background of belief and knowledge, and fill in the text to create a dense world of meanings and associations. As this begins to happen, implicature shades off into suggestion, and we are no longer in the realm of communication and shared understandings, but rather in the fluid world of imagination and other transformations of thought.
While this passage refers to higher-order implicatures that are communicated, there is no reason to suppose that corresponding higher-order meanings that are not communicated cannot arise.
Third, I argued in Parikh [11] that, contrary to Grice, literal meanings and implicatures co-determine each other. Not only do literal meanings help to determine implicatures but implicatures also help to determine literal meanings. If this is true, then can a second-order meaning also influence an implicature and the literal meaning? If so, then that would introduce an element of mixed motives into the determination of even "lower-level" meanings albeit indirectly.
The foregoing allows us to classify flows of information as shown in Figure 11 . At the level of basic and higher-order communicative flows, games of partial information that are generally coordinative apply and the flows satisfy Definition 0. When basic flows are non-communicative, what I have called strategic interactions in Parikh [10] are relevant. Here the assumption of common knowledge of the relevant interactions is no longer valid. At the level of higher-order non-communicative flows, mixed motive signaling and content games (and strategic interactions) provide the right models as we have seen in Figures 9 and 10 Stalnaker [19] discusses the following remark of US Treasury Secretary John Snow made in May 2003: "When the dollar is at a lower level it helps exports, and I think exports are getting stronger as a result." The announcement caused the dollar to drop precipitously in value even though only a commonplace economic insight had been stated. I cannot analyze this statement here, but simply observe that its "deeper" meaning belongs to the realm of higher-order non-communicative flows where common knowledge does not obtain. That is, not only is this higher-order meaning not communicative because it arises from a generation game like the mother-child signaling game, but the interaction also fails to satisfy the common knowledge condition that the latter game does exhibit. The appropriate model for this kind of meaning is strategic interactions of the kind mentioned in Parikh [10] . As a higher-order meaning, it supervenes on the interlocutors playing the relevant games of understanding to first derive the statement's literal meaning and possible implicatures.
To return to the starting point of this section, I believe that treating natural language as cheap talk has been a red herring. It is possibly because economists have been more concerned with eliminating superfluous equilibria in more familiar economic settings that they have been led to ignore some of the issues involved in linguistic communication. We can now perhaps return to the motivating problem of economics-how to oust unwanted equilibria in economic games-and see how these aspects of language can help their goals. How, for example, do the right choices emerge in the job market signaling situation when costly but beneficial interviews are part of the game?
In any case, my concern in this paper has been with language, and language is truly rich not just in the quantitative sense assumed in cheap talk games but especially in the logical and rhetorical devices it affords that enable us to persuade one another of our beliefs and desires. But these resources do not come cheap, they come with costs and benefits.
